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ECONOMICS BETWEEN E'XPECTATION AND APPLICATION 
1. The image of economie science 
The famous American economist Milton Friedman once typified the economist 
as follows. He is the member of a group of shipwrecked people washed onto 
an uninhabited island with a can of beans as their only sustenance who 
declares, after various ideas have been proposed to get the can open, 
"Let us assume that we have a can opener." 
This caricature of the economist depicts him as a person rather out of 
touch with reality. By merely assuming that the tooi so badly needed was 
available he denies the practical problem for which a solution is being 
sought, and drifts into a dream world. Matter-of-fact and practically-
minded people have more often accused scholars of losing contact with 
reality. It cannot be denied, though, that in the past two centuries 
there has been an increasing influence of scholarship on practice. This 
is not only because of the goods and services whose availability and 
use—thans to science—we take for granted, but due equally to scientific 
theories whose popularised versions change our worldview. Those ivory 
tower characters have had a remarkable influence after all. 
Regardless, or perhaps precisely because of this, scholarship has become 
a social concern. Increasingly, the most important criterion to measure 
academie research is its relevance. Substantial contributions to the 
solution of practical problems are expected from scholars and theoreti-
cians. The public wants relevant research, not only relevant with the 
advantage of hindsight, but relevance demonstrable already in the planning 
stages of research projects. An economie approach to scientific research 
is perceived: it is an investment in means whose dividends are to be 
definable and predictable. Obviously "relevance" used in this way can 
only bear on specifically stated questions and objectives. Relevance 
in the sense of influence on the reigning world picture is something 
difficult to demonstrate in advance. How do scholars react to this kind 
of societal involvement (or is it perhaps interference)? Are they sensi-
tive to it, and could they be? These are urgent questions especially 
for economists today. 
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To arrive at answers to the above wuestions one must recall that scholar-
ship has developed out of the search for solutions to practical problems. 
This is true also for economie thought. What in other words has been re-
proached in economics as a lack of contact with reality has gradually 
sifted in. 
In Greek (Aristotle, Xenophon) and in medieval thought the primary problem 
was how to define and arrive at a fair exchange and a just price. Despite 
the fact that money, markets and profit came into play here, this kind 
of thinking cannot be classified as market analysis in the modern sense of 
the phrase. Market analysis as we know it concentrates on the mutual 
1) 
relations between production, consumption and distribution. 
From the 16th through the 18th century in Western Europe, simultaneous 
with the establishment of its nation-states, of central importance was 
the economie welfare of the nations' peoples. Af ter medieval times a new 
practical problem appeared. Numerous books and especially pamphlets 
appeared then which counselled the "prince" on economie policy. Despite 
many kinds of national variations, this period can be typified on the whole 
as that of so-called mercantilist thought. Basically mercantilist thought 
holds that the welfare of a country is assured only by nationalistic 
government control that regulates matters. Particularly the regulation 
of (international) trade meant that the economie life could flourish and the 
national state become more powerful. 
Mercantilism appears to us to be pre-eminently practically directed and 
therefore relevant. The norm of the just price retreats into the background 
2) 
and an economic-political objective takes its place. Manipulable cause-
effect relations in economie life are sought in-order to realise this 
objective. 
The relevance of the economie thought just briefly sketched does not 
need to be doubted. Is it not immediately engaged in practical economie 
activity and pointed through prescriptions and counsel? Although not all 
instructions and advice are equally wise of even correct, the engagement 
as such is not an issue. The character of economie thought takes a turn, 
however, with the appearaence of the famous book by Adam Smith, Inquiry 
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Though the 
title clearly shows that Smith is still occupied with the mercantilist 
problematic, and that the still understands "political economy" as "a 
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branch of the science of a statesman of legislator", in nis view the role 
of the statesman changes with regard to economie life. For Smith a well-
defined government policy is not the final guarantee for a country's 
welfare. Just as recuperation from illness is attributed not only to 
the intervention of a doctor but also to the organic principle of preser-
3) 
vation, in the same way the economy has its own principle of preservation. 
It is the job of the statesman to give this element wide room. Economie 
analysis must now concentrate on the question of that a healthy economie 
situation is. 
Economie analysis changes the character that it has had up to this time. 
The analysis is no longer directed to the discovery of cause-effect 
4) 
relations that are pertinent to governing , but it seeks the hidden 
plan or the hidden mechanism of the economie process. Its hiddenness 
implies that daily or ordinary experience will not itself bring compre-
hension of that mechanism. Almost whenever the question arises as to why 
the economy is poor, one points to visible governing institutions, all 
of which implies that there is a guilty party. Comprehension of the 
law of the economie process, though, is not immediately tied to a practical 
5) interest because along with this comprehension comes the notion of a 
relative independence of economie life. In this way the relation between 
theory and practice is reformulated and as a result a problem of rele-
vancy can arise. 
The problem thus states is not (yet) urgent, however. The situation is 
comparable to the understanding of the law of pressure and volume in 
gasses, for instance. This law also is always valid, no matter what 
transpires. Nevertheless, to acknowledge this carries practical impli-
cations for by means of this knowledge the invention of the steam engine, 
for one example, was made possible. To draw an analogy from this: the 
comprehension of the hidden law of the economie process can allow a 
directing policy that optimally promotes the "wealth of nations"; therefore, 
there is apparently not relevancy problem after all. This position, 
generally stated, can be illustrated by an optimistically tuned publication 
from the recent past. 
In 1966 a book appeared in the U.S.A. under the title, New Dimensions of 
Political Economy; in 1968 the German translation was published under 
the even more telling title, Das Zeitalter des Oekonomen (The Age of the 
Economist). The author, Walter Heller, is an economist of German origin, 
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who was chairman of the Economie Advisory Council under presidents Kennedy 
7) 
and Johnson. The book gives expression to the high regard economists 
enjoyed in the Sixties because of the practical relevance of their work. 
Heller describes at the start of the book that for the first time in 
history two presidents dared to apply the whole arsenal of the modern 
economie toolbox. This courage shows up best in American circumstances 
where a much greater reluctance to direct the economie process existed 
(and exists) than in most Western European countries. In Heller's opinion, 
though, the policies were a success. Since 1961 there was an uninterrupted 
expansion of the American economy because the availability mechanisms 
were put into use. In the first five years of this growth seven million 
jobs were created, profits were doubled, and the real social product 
increased in volume by one-third. Simultaneously the mental gulf between 
economists and businessmen, between advisors and deciding bodies gradually 
narrowed. The paralyzing effect of economie myths and the mistaken 
anxieties that surrounded economie policy dissipated. Finally it was 
recógnized what the law in 1946 had already established, that the govern-
ment holds comprehensive responsibility for economie stability and 
growth. According to Heller, the issue here is incisive change. No new 
theory is being formulated but it is the fulfilment of the keynesian 
revolution—30 years after J.M. Keynes fired the first shot. Consequently, 
economists have emerged as the presidents' closest advisors. They are 
above all able to show the president how to achieve balanced growth of 
the economy. 
Heller makes an interesting remark in the foreword to the German edition. 
He sees the timing of that publication as fitting. In 1968 both the U.S.A. 
and Germany had to show clearly if a dynamic economie policy, in which 
modern economie instruments were directed towards stable growth, could 
also sufficiently meet the heavy demands that were now being placed on it. 
At the time the U.S. economy faced the high tide of a business cycle. How 
was it possible to rein in the by now high inflation without stunting the 
growth? Meanwhile the German economy faced a recession. How could growth 
be restimulated without again producing high inflation? 
Almost twenty years have passed since then. Whatever has happened to 
the high-pitched expectations that were cherished by both economists and 
politicians? Economie growth in western economies has drastically 
weakened, in some cases even become negative. In combination with the 
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continual technological development this has led to massive unemployment. 
Inflation is stubborn; with much effort and at the cost of substantial 
effects on income, it has decreased recently. Government attempts to 
improve employment opportunities, however, threaten also to activate 
inflation again. In brief, since the Thirties there has never been such 
a deep depression. 
It can no longer be denied that there is a problem of relevancy: economic-
theoretical knowledge and the policies based upon it no longer lead to 
8) 
the expected results. This problem is emphasized all the more too 
because the theoretical research that took place at the same time was 
9) 
nonetheless judged to be fruitful. On the other hand, there is no 
doubt, that most economists in general are motivated by the desire to 
improve society. Thus can the problem of relevancy not be blamed on 
wrong intentions. What is going on then? This question is being posed 
by the public as well as among economists themselves. 
It is our thesis that economie science is drifting in a relevancy crisis. 
This crisis is caused as much by the too highly placed expectations of the 
policy makers as by the overly ambitious pretensions to which economists 
hold. With regard to these expectations we will show that the practice 
which longs for theoreticians to develop the instruments to realise 
objectives is hereby asking for too much. Instruments are never a matter 
of theory only. Regarding the pretensions we will show that economie 
science overestimates itself by trusting that it has the proper approach 
to analyzing reality even though it recognizes that the available policy 
tools are still imperfect. In our opinion moderation of both expectations 
and pretensions is necessary; such a moderation should have material 
consequences for policy formation and theorizing. In this way we do not 
pretend that the problem of relevance is resolved. Because of the inherent 
diferences between praxis and theory, there will always be a "friction" 
in the process of transforming scientific knowledge for the service of 
the general public. For that reason we are treating a specific problem 
of relevance in this article, actual to our situation. Subsequently we 
will deal with the character of expectation that lives in the public 
and the pretensions that theoreticians put forth. 
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2. The Expectations in Praxis 
It has only been for a few decades that one can speak of serious expec-
tations that live particularly in the sphere of government policy decision-
making based on economie science. Actually this has been the case only 
since the Second World War. This change is attributed to the dying off 
10) 
of the attitude of "social fatalism". This attitude held that economie 
provesses were to be seen as the result of impersonal powers or "laws" 
that indeed were perceived but which were unchangeable in the way they 
worked. Instead of this fatalism a confidence in the ability to regulate 
the economy has grown, even though the controlling influence is not always 
properly used. 
The earlier attitude of fatalism is rather surprising. Economie science, 
as a child of the Enlightenment, was a sign of the continual improvement 
of society. In seeking systematïc knowledge of the eocnomic process, 
however, it appeared that there were unpleasant and even uncontrollable 
results. Already in its classical period economics was known as the 
"dismal science", the science that studied the laws of income distribution 
and in that way arrived at the conclusion that the "best possible world" 
for nearly everyone meant an existence at a minimal Standard of living. 
Later on it was shown that the business cycle was inevitable, which meant 
disequilibrium—especially painful in the depression phase—instead of the 
equilibrium that really ought to have existed. 
The reality of the Standard of living, fortunately, was otherwise. At 
least the doom that seemed to hang over income. level was in fact contra-
dicted in a large part of the western world. Conjunctural bad weather 
remained an item of concern longer but Keynes' insights made fatalism 
disappear in that matter, too. Theoreticians and politicians alike allowed 
their conviction to grow that massive unemployment had become a thing of 
the past. 
Due to the change in thinking just described, expectations in praxis 
with respect to economie science were constantly being pitched higher, 
that is to say, policies based on economie theories must surely be 
effective. This would not only be so in broad terms but itwouldbe precise 
up to a tenth of a percent. Apparent political effectiveness, then, is 
the measure for the relevance of theories. 
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Although the statement can no longer be avoided that effectiveness 
is not very great at all anymore and is sometimes even completely 
nonexistent, the question can now be asked if the relation between 
effectiveness and relevance it all that direct. In other words, may 
apparent political effectiveness be the exclusive ground on which the 
relevance of a theory is tested and thereby attribute its reason to 
exist? In order to answer this question we will pursue what factors influence 
11) political effectiveness. 
To begin with, effectiveness of an economie political program is de-
pendent on the possible realisability of that for which one aims. 
Easily enough can something be desired which is impossible to fulfill, 
as is the case now. Policy effectiveness falls short as a result of a 
lack of clear and coordinated socio-economic objectives. In practice 
one 'too quickly assumes that the realisation of each of the five 
12) 
well-known objectives of an economie political program are in harmony 
with each other. Indeed, the combined objectives express a balanced, 
growing economy, but in the process of actualization they compete 
with each other, that is to say, more of one often implies less of the 
other. In the recent past one wanted to do too much all at once, without 
13) 
comprehending the limits. In fact, the relevance of economie theory 
is hereby overlooked because insight into the mutual dependence of 
the objectives is an important result of the analysis. 
Policy effectiveness that falls short is also a consequence of the 
lack of sufficiënt effective instruments by which the eocnomic process 
can be influenced. The nature of our economie system generates a 
preference for globally functional instruments, that is, instruments 
that have effect on the entire economie system, without taking into 
account the differences within the system. In this way the structure 
of the system remains a given for economie policy and the accent falls 
one-sidedly on the conjunctural features. The structure of the economie 
system, however, is developing also. Politics would do well to take this 
into account, also by speaking out about the desirability of structural 
features. 
A third factor determining policy effectiveness is the way in which 
practical political decisions are made and how the bureaucracy carries 
out those decisions. 
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In these three factors eocnomic theory itself nas managed to stay 
out of range of the discussion and thus the relation between effective-
ness and relevance seems indirect. Contrary to this observation, it 
can now be contended that one is concerned here with a disruption in 
that relation and that by restoring order the link would again become 
a direct one. This is an academie observation, though, for in everyday 
policy programs these factors continue to play a role. This implies 
that policy makers also need to evaluate themselves critically. 
Such a critique cannot be passed onto theory, as if practice in this 
regard can forego its own responsibility. 
The most important point on this subject has not yet been made, 
however. Regardless of problems in practice, the expectation could 
exist that because of economie science in principle an infallible and 
perfectly precise economie policy is attainable. As we see it, this 
expectation can never be fulfilled because of the character traits of 
theory itself. There is by necessity a discrepancy between theory and 
politics in practice. To be sure, theories influence substantially 
15) the outlook of economie policy, but this policy does not flow forth 
purely and simply out of a general theory. There are a variety of reasons 
, . «. . . 16) to explain this. 
i) A theory cannot force matters with regard to the policy that an 
adherent to this theory ought to follow: the theory can usually 
support various political positions, because a theory is general. 
In order to establish a policy it is necessary first to determine 
precisely . what the concrete situation is. On that alone opinions 
can already vary. 
ii) One is concerned with an economie theory and a policy deriving 
from it which takes objectives and means into account to the extent 
that they belong to the economie phenomena. In practice, though, 
other aspects of economie policy need to be respected as well. 
In this way an economie policy (e.g., the abandoning of a minimum 
wage in order to combat unemployment) can for other reasons be 
unacceptable. Or, the effectiveness by which an economie objective 
could be reached can be just as dependent on the use of non-
economic measures (e.g., a change in the law). 
We return to the question we posed about the reaction between effective-
ness of policy and relevance of theories, concluding that this relation 
does not progress in a direct line and deductively. Effectiveness 
is something that is also dependent on practice itself and cannot 
be guaranteed because of a theory. In other words, the ineffectiveness 
of policy programs is not simply to be reduced to the irrelevance of 
an economie theory. Theories are abstract and can be nothing'elsebut 
that. For that reason apparent ineffectiveness could not be the reason 
to reject a tehory. Theoretical insight must be complemented in practice 
by insights into the concrete situation and by wisdom. Experience, 
common sense, personal judgement, a sensitivity to relationships and 
the other virtues that clothe a good statesman are, along with academie 
17) insight, ïndispensable for an efficacious policy program. Wherever 
this is too lightly treated, expectations will run too high. 
The Pretensions of Economie Science 
Expectations in daily life are not unrelated to claims made by theore-
ticians. Economists do not only have the intention to improve the 
world but they pretend to offer relevant insight into it as well. 
Parallel to the expectations of the public is the growth of such pre-
tensions, as Walter Heller's witness showed (cf. opening section). 
As much as there are disappointed expectations now, so too have 
economists begun to doubt more and more the relevance of economie 
theory. It is even being said that there is a growing, serious 
disagreement about the supposed reasons for this lack of relevance. 
18) 
The phenomenon of schools of thought comes to the fore. No 
matter how pluriform'or divided, the mainstream of economie refl'ection, 
which also has the most influence on daily life, has come under 
sharp criticism. Two important points deserve to be highlighted: 
a) critique on the current view of the subject matter 
b) critique on the established method of research. 
Critique on the current view of the subject matter of economics. 
The irrelevance of eocnomictheory is clearest in macro-economie 
problems, i.e., problems that pertain to the national economy and that 
are of immediate political importance. At the same time the comprehension 
and attendant control of inflation, unemployment and negative growth 
has been very limited. An improvement in the situation in the first 
place requires that macro-economics be founded in the so-called micro-
economics, a system of theories about individual economie acts and their 
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consequences. Aside fromt the question whether such a foundation is 
in itself problematic, doubt arises about the relevance of the .currently 
available micro-economics. 
In this micro-economics the view on the subject matter is brought 
out. This view establishes in principle the explanatory capacity of 
economie science and similarly the capacity of control. The traditional 
definition of economics, then, is contained in the expression "logic 
of choice". The attention is thereby drawn to the logically necessary 
choice that arises frequently in the interaction between activities 
of individual persons, namely, the choice as to what degree given 
aims can be realised with given scarce means of alternative uses. 
This becomes a scientifically interesting question whenever the goal-
realisation occurs through exchange on the market under the condition 
that everyone strives for maximum results. The interesting features 
of this are: 
1) if it can be shown that every market can be in equilibrium, that is 
to say, that at a given price there are no buyers left who still 
want to buy at that price without there being a corresponding supply, 
or, in opposite terms, that there were no suppliers left who still 
wanted to sell at that price without there being buyers; and 
2) if it can be shown that the disturbance of a given market equilibrium 
sets a process of adjustment in motion towards a new equilibrium. To 
rephrase the above, the interesting question is whether it can be shown 
that, given the assumed behaviour of the individual, a market achieves 
its equilibrium through price adjustment. In these analyses, account 
can still be taken of the interdependence between markets so that 
theorizing arrivés at research into the possible general equilibrium 
19) in a system of interdependent markets. 
The abundance of critique on micro-economics in the given sense of 
a general equilibrium system concentrates on two points. In the first 
place individuals rarely (or even almost never) behave in accordance 
with the rule of striving for maximum results. Too great a part of 
actual behaviour is thus ignored or explained away. Secondly, equili-
brium in the market place is not only achieved through price adjustment 
but also, for example, through adjustments in the proffered amounts. 
In other words, current micro-economics has removed itself too far 
from reality; it has created its own (imaginary) world. In it one is 
kept busy with phenomena in the market that are reduced to stylized 
behavioral choices.- In forming theories these stylized facts in turn 
give rise to other stylized facts. This becomes clear in the way 
micro-economics is worked out. In this view all activities of the 
economie process must. be interpreted as exchange transactions. For 
example, production must be seen as exchange; likewise the choice 
someone can make to invest some of his income now or at some future 
time (or even to not invest it at all out to leave it as an inheritance) 
is seen as an exchange transaction. This is how fictional markets 
are introduced. 
Admittedly it must be stated that economists in the mainstream react 
to the above-mentioned points of critique by proposing more realistic 
theories. In this way one attempts to analyse individual transactions 
with only a limited knowledge of the economie subjects, so that 
uncertainty, expectations and the costs to get information begin to 
play a role. In analysis of the market, processes of disequilibrium 
and of the exercise of power take a larger place. It remains to be seen, 
however, if fundamental limits to the manner of approach as such can 
hereby be removed. 
Critique on the established method of research. 
Apart from the problem of correspondence between the world of theore-
tical entities and reality is also the problem of the nature of processes. 
The pretension of theory has long been that-it thinks itself able to 
articulate the laws that obtain for processes. the natural sciences 
provide the big example here. The method held to in economie science 
cannot differ essentially from what economists say the method in the 
natural sciences is. Their idea of the method for the natural sciences, 
where one can speak of explanations and predictions, has not always 
stayed the same, yet in mainstream economie methodology the so-called 
20) hypothetical-deductive method has become influential. Characteristic 
of this method of theorizing are three steps: 
1) the construction of a theoretical model based on certain assumptions, 
2) the logical deduction of hypothesis on the reality in the model, and 
21 ) 
3) the testing of the hypotheses against empirical data. 
This hypothetical-deductive method has lately come under increasing 
critique as much from within the philosophy of science itself as from 
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within economics. In the scope of this article it is not possible to 
do more than give an impression ofthis by means of the issue of the 
relation between theory and reality. Two objections can be pointed out. 
i) May it be said that when a hypothesis has withstood the empirical 
test an explanation of the phenomenon in question is then also 
obtained? Assume that the hypothesis said that the purchase of 
cauiliflower was sensitive to the price level so that more cauli-
flower would be purchased at a lower price and less at a higher 
price. Assume moreover that empirical data collected over a period 
of years indeed corroborate this picture. Where does one get an 
explanation of this order ofevents? It can be found in the theory 
of consumer behaviour, in which concepts such as preferences and 
utility functions appear as well as the assumption that the 
consumer shall strive for a maximum satisfaction of needs. That is 
in brief the entirety of the theoretical model, in which also the 
so-called laws are present. The validity of the logical reasoning 
and the explanational pattern it encloses do not rest on empirical 
proofs but on logic. The meaning of the theoretical model Is merely 
to generate hypotheses that can be tested empirically. 
It would be improper, however, to intend to understand the testing 
of the hypothesis as "proof" too for the underlying theory, although 
this happens easily because of the interconnections among the 
three steps described in the method. One argument for this 
impropriety is that the same hypothesis can be decuded out af a 
variety of theoretical models. In other wor'ds, when a deduced 
hypothesis is established through empirical observation, then it 
is sooner established that coincidental facts correspond with the 
theory than that the theory agrees with the facts. And that is 
precisely the criticism levelled at this method. 
ii) This method implies that universal laws are drawn theoretically 
from certain assumptions. This means that mainstream micro-economics 
is a system of theories with predetermined results. But is that 
model satisfactory? Reality as we experience it departs strongly 
from it. More recent developments in micro-economics attempt to 
theoretically hold that in reality chance, uncertainty and risk,all 
play a role. At the same time, however, it must be accepted that 
predetermined results are no longer possible. The question is if 
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in this way the original concept of orderliness in economie life 
is not definitively undermined such that we are obliged to look 
for a new direction. 
4. Assessment 
In our first section we posed the question if economists can meet the 
demand for relevance. Our criticism of the mainstram extends to the 
point where we doubt whether there are opportunities to be found in it 
to bend theory back towards reality. Things have become firmly en-
trenched in a striving toward axiomisation, i.e., reformulation and 
extension of theoretical insights in a deductive system, based on 
several indubitable axioms. The interests of mathematics—and of statis-
tics, whenever one deals with quahtification—has come so much to the 
fore that that sooner determines what qualifies as an interesting 
problem than the reverse, that the problems determine which solution 
techniques to employ. In order to be relevant in the sense of formulating 
a theory where the relation of theory to reality can be reconsidered, 
a lot of leeway is demanded of mainstream economics. To this end two 
different kinds of attempts can be distinguished. 
The first attempt can be clarified with the help of Milton Friedman's 
conceptions. He wants to tie in closely with daily life experiences 
and the urgent problems there. Theorizing is subservient to politics 
whenever it offers valid, non-trivial predictions about the changes in 
economie quantities. These predictions, acoording to Friedman, are 
immediately relevant for policy decision-making because in these 
decisions account can be taken ofthe changes in the circumstances and 
the effects of the policy itself. Briefly summarized his adage is: 
the success of a theory is the success of its predictions, and that is 
likewise its relevance. 
In Section 1 we noted the playful description Friedman uses of what an 
economist does. It seems to contain a purposeful ambiguity, though. 
On the one hand one can read that an economist is someone who departs 
from the urgent practical problem at hand and Friendman objects to that. 
On the other hand he holds that an economist is free to work with 
assumptions that at first glance look unrealistic as long as the theory 
22) delivers usable predictions. In this way Friedman's position is 
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typified as instrumentalistic. Although this position looks attractive 
at-first, two serious, interlocking objections adhere to it. The first 
is that, because of the connection to practical problems, theorizing 
becomes fragmentary, losing the character of a coherent whole and thus 
with every new problem must start over at the beginning as it were. The 
second objection is that a certain theory can give correct predictions 
but as such cannot yet offer an explanation. That is to say, it cannot 
offer insight into the way causes work whereby it becomes clear why 
a prediction is accurate. It also becomes unclear why scholarship 
should have such a privileged function in drafting predictions. The 
businessman, the politician, andthe fortune-teller can all make pre-
dictions, too, that could come true. 
We are able to conclude that attempts to be relevant a la Friedman do 
notprovidea veritable alternative for the mainstream. In this mahner 
theory threatens to lose itself in its service to the public. 
The second kind of attempt to reconsider the relation of theory to 
reality has already been pointed out at the outset of this section 
when a critical discussion of the vision on subject matter and method 
in the mainstream was raised. In offering an alternative that is more 
•relevant, the concern is to regauge the fundamental ideas and methods 
of economics. In our opinion the crisis of relevancy must be approached 
along this route. At the same time no one is problaiming that it will 
be a trifling effort because in fact everything is tuned topsy-turvy. 
Not only doesthe question of the nature of economics again raise its 
head—what is exchange, price, capital, income, etc.—but also the 
question what is scientific investigation comes up. Furthermore there 
are important objections to raise against the various alternatives 
that have partly materialized. In the scope ofthis article it is not 
possible the argue these issues further. We can briefly point to 
what we see as a possible way to proceed. 
Regarding the view on the subject matter, it should be noted that 
instead of accentuating a "logic of choice" the concern is for social 
processes cohering production, consumption, and distribution. Economics 
becomes more relevant whenever it breaks through the methodical 
individualism that forms the basis of mainline economics. Only then 
will there be room within theory for the historical changes in economie 
life itself, whereby also the solution to direct urgent problems not 
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too'easily becomes reduced to the question of the numberof mechanisms. 
Concerning the view on method, instead of accentuating the natural 
law character of the economie process, actors take original decisions, 
orienting themselves by means of norms or rules. This is bound to the 
idea that eocnomists also as theoreticians must oriënt themselves by 
these norms in their theorizing so that the theorizing itself comes 
into a normative perspective. 
To plead for this change does not guarantee the relevance of theories, 
though. Rather it brings up the position that critical re-justification 
of a chosen theoretical approach is required again and again. 
Academie problems are not identical to practical ones and theoretical 
solutions are not the same as practical policies. That is why in section 
2 of our discussion-it could appear that day-to-day practice has its 
own responslbility for the effectiveness of the eocnomy, a responsi-
bility that cannot be shoved onto theoreticians by demanding relevant 
theories of them. Why is daily experience's own responsibility not seen 
as self-evident? In our opinion people have looked to scholarship to 
guarantee the fulfilment of their longing for a safe (economie) future. 
This attitude is the counterpart of the instrumentalism just described. 
Just as the instrumentalist position scholarship is placed as the 
extension of practical trade, so is practical trade now seen as the 
extension of the scientific research. To rephrase this, the flipside 
of instrumentalism in scholarship is hte model-ideology in practice. 
This ideology is the belief in the "problem-solving" ability of scholar-
ship, an ability that makes this kind of impression on praxis especially 
through the constructed models in which reality is stylized and 
manipulation possibilities are presented. 
Can the model-ideology be overcome? A change in this ideology seems 
to be more difficult than a change in the scientific enterprise itself, 
as was argued for above. In scholarship a methodological debate can be car-
ried out about the re-orientation of theorizing. In praxis, the 
expectations for the structure of life are immediately placed in a 
vulnerable spot. We are concerned here, therefore, with a change in 
attitude. A breakthrough of the model-ideology means then the 
acceptance of an attitude whereby the contribution of scientific 
knowledge to policy-making becomes recognized as peculiar, and therefore 
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as limited. The security that one wants to receive from the scientific 
enterprise needs to be given up. That will create resistance not only 
psychologically speakingbut also because it will call for a change 
in world-view. 
By way of conclusion we can say that the current problem of relevancy 
steers us not only back to the foundations of economie science, but 
simultaneously also forces us to look at the fundamental premises of 
policies. Economie science will have to renew itself in its vision of 
reality; praxis will have to reclarify the proper role of economie 
science within the entirety of social practices. The result cannot be 
a seamless binding of theory and practice but instead a release from 
the embrace that was becoming mutually oppresive. 
The relevancy crisis is also, then, a cirsis in the assumptions 
concerning the relation of theory and practice. The first assumption 
is that the practical objectives of economie policy (cf. section 2) 
could be nothing else but the theoretically analysed conditions of 
24) 
a system that develops itself in a balanced manner. Yet why is it 
that practice cannot begin to set its own objectives and confront them 
later with possible limits to their realisability? 
The second assumption, which sterns from the first, is that theories 
describe reality in such a way that to transformation of those theories 
is necessary in order to apply them. For example, the theoretical 
concept unemployment is in this way also the unemployment registerend 
by the employment office (apart from possible problems of measurement). 
Should the abstract character of economie theories, though, not rather 
require that, analogous to the transformation of research in the 
natural sciences into actual technique, here also a transformation 
regarding economie policies must take place? 
The third assumption is the manageability or controllability of practice 
as it is described in the theoretical model. This assumption seems more 
and more to be an overestimation of our possibilities. Without wanting 
to fall back into a social fatalism, we would have to accept that in 
praxis our possibilities in terms of (theoretical) designs for the 
future are limited. 
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FOOTNOTES 
In many books on the history of economie thought one perceives in Greek 
and medieval thought the predecessors to modern economie science. 
Theoretical insights of today were said to be present then in a primitive 
form. It is highly questionable whether that is a sustainable inter-
pretation. 
The advice that was given upon request and voluntarily was often colored 
by specific group interests. This was so obvious that especially in 
later times it was emphatically stated in publications that such 
interests played no role. 
Cf. the following statement by Smith: "The natural effort of every 
individual to better his own condition, when suffered to exert itself 
with freedom and security, is so powerful a principle, that it is alone, 
and without any assistance, not only capable of carrying on the society 
to wealth and propsperity, but of surmounting a hundred impertinent 
obstructions with which the folly of human laws too often encumbers its 
operations; though the effect of these obstructions is always more or 
less either to encroach upon its freedom, or to diminish its security." 
"Causa" originally meant guilt. 
In the well-known textbook by W. Eucken, Die Grundlagen der National-
ökonomie (Berlin, etc. 1959, 7th edition), this was nicely illustrated 
by introducing an economie problem as a problem of wondering. Sitting 
in front of the heater in my living room I can easily wonder at the 
rather immense complex of labour division that has indeed arrived at the 
result that that heater should land in my front room. How is the 
coordination of this almightly complex possible? 
The fact that there is no relevancy problem does not automatically 
preclude that the application of knowledge that is practically fruitful 
cannot be accompanied by a "realisation problem". This is clearly seen 
in the technique but also in the economy, where appropriate institutions 
are necessary. 
W.W. Heller, Das Zeitalter des Oekonomen, Neue Dimensionen der Wirt-
schaftspolitik. Tubingen, 1968. 
This applies similarly to the current recovery of the American economy. -
"Probably the surprising revival of the American economy is the result 
of bizarre conditions that no one would have deemed possible if it 
had been predicted a few years before that things would go the way they 
did." (P. Friese, "Het 'onmogelijke' herstel van de Amerikaanse economie", 
Intermediair 19 (1983), nr. 33, p. 13). 
This is not the first time that this relevancy problem is painfully 
feit. During the crusis of the Thirties economics had no answer either. 
Yet the impasse was broken through then by J.M. Keynes. That is why 
it is sometimes said that we are now waiting- for a "new Keynes". This 
stance is slightly naive—as if the current situation, both with regard 
to the state of economie science and to that of economie practice, could 
be seen isolated from the previous crisis. 
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This expression is borrowed from A. Lowe, "Is present-day higher 
learning 'relevant'?", Social Research 38 (1971), p. 565. 
See here A.J. Vermaat-, "Beleid onder de loep", address at the Free 
University of Amsterdam, 1976; also included in Economische theorie en 
economisch politiek in discussie, ed. W. Driehuis, Leiden, 1977. 
These objectives are balance of payments, acceptable income 
distribution, stable price level, fuil employment, and satisfactory 
economie growth. 
Somewhat crudely put in a newspaper article: "The second biggest 
disaster to hit our country since World War II is that about 15 years 
ago the Labour Party took to viewing our welfare as well as our freedom 
as a natural phenomenon." (A.P. van Walsum, "Welvaart en vrijheid zijn 
geen natuurlijke verschijnselen", NRC Handelsblad, 18 februari 1984.) 
Inasmuch as it concerns given changes, not only should politicians 
but experts also must be alert to the need for an assessment of the 
context of the economie analysis that lays at the base of the politlcal 
program. It remains to be seen if policy potentials and Instruments 
could be allowed to be determined through possible data and means that 
in bygone years were considered relevant. At this point one must not 
overlook the fact that structural changes can emerge because of government 
policy in other areas. (Consider for example the policy of equal 
employment opportunity that has consequences for the labour market as 
well as for personal income distribution.) 
In this way one sees that already since Adam Smith's time the general 
theory of equilibrium has had much influence on the establishment of 
the economie order and does so still today: arguments for anti-cartel 
legislation, international labour specialisation, free wage negotiations, 
and resistance to protectionism are all derivative of this theory. 
Refer also for this to G.J. Stigler, "The Economist and the State", 
found in his collection The Economist as Preacher, Oxford, 1982. 
P. Hennipman, "Doeleinden en criteria der economische politiek", 
Theorie van de economische politiek, ed. J.E. Andriessen and M.A.G. 
Meerhaeghe, Leiden, 1962, p. 77. 
Examples of schools that present- themselves as alternatives to the main-
stream are, among others, post-keynesians, (neo-)marxism, and neo-
institutionalism. Moreover, within the mainstream itself trends occur 
more clearly, such as monetarism, the theory of rational expectations, 
and "supply-siders". 
A completely planned economy is a situation that is theoretically 
uninteresting. In such an economy, the coordination of individual 
actions is an intended result. For that matter, the result of the 
analysis is this kind of coordination between individual actions, as 
if there were a planned economy. In the first section of this essay 
the turn to economie science is typified as the search for the hidden 
plan in the economy. 
See, for example, I.M.T. Stewart, Reasoning and Method in Economics. 
An Introduction to Economie Methodology, London, etc., 1979. 
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21. "Testing" is raeant here as a neutral term. What the eact implications 
of the testing are and if it is possible to establish the truth of 
a hypothesis have provided for extensive discussion. 
22. The debate released by Friedman's publication dealt with the latter. 
Here Friedman argues against those who seek realistic axioms to construct 
their deductive system, i.e., that very unrealistic assumptions 
frequently produce a usable theory. For that reason he can easily 
resemble the mainstream with regard to assumptions about economie life. 
23. See L.A. Boland, "A Critique of Friedman's Critics", Journal of Economie 
Literature 17 (1979), pp. 503-512. Although in his methodological 
justification Friedman may be labelled as an intrumentalist, he is 
simultaneously someone with a "gospel" for the contemporary situation, 
judging by his television series, "Free to Choose". 
24. Not to mention perhaps the objective of a reasonable income distribution. 
This reasonableness can be established not only economically but also. 
ethically. In our situation, however, many economists point out that 
income differentials are too limited for a proper functioning of the 
labour market. The theoretically established conditions, so to speak, 
continue to play an important role. 
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